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9. The T.4 system remained remarkably serviceable during the detachment.
On1y in one case was a sortie lost to an unserviceable computer box.
However, it is considered that at least one member of the second line instrument
team should be T.4 experienced. Several sorties were lost due to Green Satin being
unserviceable and it is considered that second line backing of this equipment is also essential. 10. Although the bombing height was increased from 45,000 to 46,000 feet for this detachment, the Grapple Ballistic Tables were found to be satisfactory. In the case of the practice bombing ground burst the tables were interpolated, and in the case of the airburst because the height of burst was increased by the same amount as the height factor the tables were amended to read 46,000 ft instead of 45,000 ft. 11. On two of the five H.E. drops the quadrants were measured with theodolites set up in azimuth for ground zero and in elevation for the point of burst. It was found that the flash of the explosion could be read. On these occasions, however, the results as plotted by this method did not agree either with the Mk.7 Table results or with the A.W.R.E. camera analysis. As in fact the A.W.R.E. cameras and the Mk.7 Table were at variance in all H.E. cases, it is clear that there is a requirement for more accurate plotting facilities of the airburst weapon. It may well be that theodolited cameras positioned at the trig. points of the Master and Slave quadrants, plus a further one positioned at a trig. point back along the bomb line, would supply the answer. 12. Out of the 135 x 100 Ib Practice bombs dropped, 18 were heard to explode but were not observed by both quadrants due to lack of smoke/flash. A further 7 were observed to be spinners. 13. Live Drop The weapon was dropped by Squadron Leader Bates and crew flying Valiant XD 824 on 28th April, 1958. Squadron Leader Bailey and crew flying Valiant XD 822 acted as Grand Stand Aircraft. 14. The cloud cover on the morning of 28th April was almost 6/8 by 08.00 hrs the planned take off time, therefore, the Task Force Commander decided upon a one hour delay. A further delay of 30 mins was ordered before the order to take off was given. |